e General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was introduced in Europe to o er new rights and protections to people concerning their personal data. We investigate GDPR from a database systems perspective, translating its legal articles into a set of capabilities and characteristics that compliant systems must support. Our analysis reveals the phenomenon of metadata explosion, wherein large quantities of metadata needs to be stored along with the personal data to satisfy the GDPR requirements. Our analysis also helps us identify the new workloads that must be supported under GDPR. We design and implement an open-source benchmark called GDPRbench that consists of workloads and metrics needed to understand and assess personal-data processing database systems. To gauge how ready the modern database systems are for GDPR, we modify Redis and PostgreSQL to be GDPR compliant. Our evaluations show that this modi cation degrades their performance by up to 5×. Our results also demonstrate that the current database systems are two to four orders of magnitude worse in supporting GDPR workloads compared to traditional workloads (such as YCSB), and also do not scale as the volume of personal data increases. We discuss the real-world implications of these ndings, and identify research challenges towards making GDPR compliance e cient in production environments. We release all of our so ware artifacts and datasets at h p://www.gdprbench.org PVLDB Reference Format:
INTRODUCTION
"Measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so. "
Galileo Galilei
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For any use beyond those covered by this license, obtain permission by emailing info@vldb.org. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to the VLDB Endowment. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, Vol. 13, No. X ISSN 2150-8097. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14778/xxxxxxx.xxxxxxx e European Union enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [36] on May 25th 2018 to counter widespread abuse of personal data. While monetizing personal data at scale has existed since the early dot-com days, a systemic disregard for the privacy and protection of personal data is a recent phenomenon. For example, in 2017, Uber secretly paid o [26] hackers to delete the stolen personal data; Yahoo! confessed [31] that three years ago, a the had exposed all 3 billion of its user records; Facebook admi ed [41] that their APIs allowed illegal harvesting of user data, which in turn in uenced the U.S. and U.K. democratic processes. GDPR rights and responsibilities. To deter such practices, GDPR declares the privacy and protection of personal data as a fundamental right of all European people. It grants several new rights to the EU consumers including the right to access, right to rectication, right to be forgo en, right to object, and right to data portability. GDPR also assigns responsibilities to companies that collect and process personal data. ese include seeking explicit consent before using personal data, notifying data breaches within 72 hours of discovery, maintaining records of processing activities, etc.. Failing to comply with GDPR could result in he y penalties: up to €20M or 4% of global revenue, whichever higher. For instance, in January 2019, Google was ned €50M for lacking customer consent in their ads personalization [37] ; in July 2019, British Airways was ned £184M for failing to safeguard personal data of their customers [33] . GDPR compliance is challenging. Compliance with GDPR is challenging for several reasons. First, GDPR's interpretation of personal data is broad as it includes any information that relates to a natural person, even if it did not uniquely identify that person. For example, search terms sent to Google are covered under GDPR. is vastly increases the scope of data that comes under GDPR purview. Second, several GDPR regulations are intentionally vague in their technical speci cation to accommodate future advancements in technologies. is causes confusion among developers of GDPR-compliant systems. Finally, several GDPR requirements are fundamentally at odds with the design principles and operating practices of modern computing systems [40] . It is no surprise that recent estimates [8, 23] peg the compliance rate to be less than y percent. Analyzing GDPR. In this work, we investigate how to understand, achieve, and benchmark GDPR compliance of database systems. To do so, we analyze GDPR and distill its articles into capabilities and characteristics that datastores must support. We make three key observations in our analysis.
1. We identify and characterize the phenomenon of metadata explosion, whereby every personal data item is associated with up to seven metadata properties (like its purpose, time-to-live, objections etc) that govern its behavior. By elevating each personal data item into an active entity that has its own set of rules, GDPR mandates that it could no longer be used as a fungible commodity. is is signi cant from a database standpoint as it severely impacts both the control-and data-path operations of datastores.
2. We observe that GDPR's goal of data protection by design and by default con icts with the traditional system design goals of optimizing for performance, cost, and reliability. For example, in order to notify people a ected by data breaches, a company may want to keep an audit trail of all accesses to their personal data. From a datastore perspective, this turns every read operation into a read followed by a write.
3. Lastly, we identify that GDPR allows new forms of interactions with the datastore. We discuss the characteristics of these GDPR queries, and their implications for database systems.
GDPRbench. As our analysis reveals, GDPR signi cantly a ects the design and operation of datastores that hold personal data. However, none of the existing benchmarks recognize the abstraction of personal data: its characteristics, storage restrictions, or interfacing requirements. We design and implement GDPRbench, a new open-source benchmark that represents the functionalities of a datastore deployed by a company that collects and processes personal data. e design of GDPRbench is informed by painstaking analysis of the legal cases arising from GDPR from its rst year of roll-out. GDPRbench is composed of four core workloads: Controller, Customer, Processor, and Regulator; these core workloads are not captured by any database benchmark available today. GDPRbench captures three benchmarking metrics for each workload: correctness, completion time, and space overhead.
Evaluating GDPR-Compliant DBMS. Finally, to gauge how ready the modern database systems are for GDPR, we take two widelyused, open-source database systems, Redis [10] (an in-memory NoSQL store) and PostgreSQL [9] (a relational DBMS), and modify them to be GDPR-compliant. We followed recommendations from the developers of these tools [12, 9] in making them GDPRcompliant; the goal was to make minimal changes, not to redesign the systems for GDPR compliance. While both systems are able to achieve GDPR compliance with a small amount of e ort, the resulting systems experienced a performance slow down of 5× and 2× respectively. We evaluated the performance of GDPRcompliant Redis and PostgreSQL using GDPRbench. We observed that both systems were operating at a throughput that is two to ve orders of magnitude lower than that of the traditional workloads. Our analyses and experiments identify several implications for administering GDPR-compliant database systems in the real world.
Limitations. While GDPR is clear in its high level goals, its speci cations are vague in several articles. For example, it does not specify how soon a er a right to be forgo en request should the data be removed. In our analysis, we resolve such ambiguity by making strict interpretation of the requirements (in this case, delete the data synchronously in real-time). We acknowledge that in practice, a company may choose a more relaxed interpretation that saves cost and reduces overhead. Second, our e orts at in-troducing GDPR compliance in Redis and PostgreSQL is guided by the current best practices. We realize that performance degradation could be further reduced with GDPR speci c optimizations and system redesigns. It is not the focus of this work. Finally, the design of GDPRbench is guided by several factors including (i) our interpretation of GDPR, (ii) court rulings and GDPR usecases in the real-world, and (iii) the two database systems that we investigated. As such, we recognize that the current iteration of GDPRbench is a snapshot in time, and may need to evolve as more technical and legal use cases emerge. Summary of contributions. Our work lays the foundation for understanding and benchmarking the impact of GDPR on database systems. In particular, we make the following contributions:
• GDPR Analysis: Our work is the one of the rst to explore GDPR from a database systems perspective. We analyze the articles of GDPR, both individually and collectively, to distill them into a ributes and actions for database systems. In doing so, we (i) observe the phenomenon of metadata explosion, and (ii) identify the new workloads that personal data systems must support.
• Design and Implementation of GDPRbench: To enable customers, companies and regulators interpret GDPR compliance in a rigorous and systematic way, we design an opensource GDPR centric benchmark. In GDPRbench, we model the queries and workloads that datastores encounter in the real-world, and develop metrics to succintly represent their behavior. We make all our so ware artifacts publicly available at h p://www.gdprbench.org.
• Experimental Evaluation: We discuss our e ort into transforming Redis and PostgreSQL to be GDPR-compliant. Our evaluation shows that due to GDPR compliance, Redis experiences a performance degradation of 5×, and PostgreSQL, 2×. Using GDPRbench, we show the completion time and storage space overhead of these compliant systems against real-world GDPR workloads. Finally, we share our insights on deploying compliant systems in production environments, implications of scaling personal data, as well as research challenges towards making GDPR compliance, fast and e cient.
BACKGROUND
We begin with a primer on GDPR including its internal structure and its adoption challenges in the real world. en, we discuss related work to set a context for our contributions.
GDPR Overview
e European parliament adopted GDPR on April 14th 2016, and made it an enforceable law in all its member states starting May 25th 2018. Its objective is to set ground rules for processing personal data such that its commoditization does not con ict with the rights and protection of the people.
GDPR is wri en 1 as 99 articles that describe its legal requirements, and 173 recitals that provide additional context and clarications to these articles. e articles (henceforth pre xed with G ) could be grouped into ve broad categories. G 1-11 articles layout the de nitions and principles of personal data processing; G 12-23 establish the rights of the people; then G 24-50 mandate the responsibilities of the data controllers and processors; the next 26 describe the role and tasks of supervisory authorities; and the remainder of them cover liabilities, penalties and speci c situations. 1 even the CS people in our team found it quite readable! We expand on the three categories that concern systems storing personal data. Principles of data processing. GDPR establishes several core principles governing personal data. For example, G 5 requires that data collection be for a speci c purpose, be limited to what is necessary, stored only for a well de ned duration, and protected against loss and destruction. G 6 de nes the lawful basis for processing, while G 7 describes the role of consent. Rights of data subjects. GDPR grants 12 explicit and excercisable rights to every data subject (a natural person whose personal data is collected). ese rights are designed to keep people in loop throughout the lifecycle of their personal data. At the time of collection, people have the right to know the speci c purpose and exact duration for which their data would be used (G 13, 14) . At any point, people can access their data (G 15), rectify errors (G 16), request erasure (G 17), download or port their data to a third-party (G 20), object to it being used for certain purposes (G 21), andnally, withdraw from automated decision-making (G 22). In the rest of the paper, we use the terms, data subjects and customers, synonymously.
Responsibilities of data controllers. e third group of articles outline the responsibilities of data controllers (entities that collect and utilize personal data) and data processors (entities that process personal data on behalf of a controller). To clarify, when Net ix runs their recommendation algorithm on Amazon's MapReduce platform, Net ix is the controller and Amazon, the processor. Key responsibilities include designing secure infrastructure (G 24, 25), maintaining records of processing (G 30), notifying data breaches within 72 hours (G 33, 34), analyzing risks prior to processing large amounts of personal data (G 35, 36) and controlling the location of data (G 44) . Additionally, the controllers should create interfaces for people to exercise their GDPR rights.
GDPR from a Database Perspective
GDPR de nes four entities-controller, customer, processor, and regulator-that interact with the data store. Figure-1 shows how three distinct types of data ows between the GDPR entities and data stores. e database that hosts personal data and its associated metadata (purpose, objections etc.,) is the focus of our work. We distinguish it from the other store that contains non-GDPR and derived data as the rules of GDPR do not apply to them. e controller is responsible for collection and timely deletion of personal data as well as managing its GDPR metadata throughout the lifecycle. e customers interact with the data store to exercise their GDPR rights. e processor uses the stored personal data to generate derived data and intelligence, which in turn powers the controller's businesses and services. Finally, the regulators interact with the datastores to investigate complaints and to ensure that rights and responsibilities are complied with.
Our focus on datastores is motivated by the high proportion of GDPR articles that concern them. From out of the 99 GDPR articles, 31 govern the behavior of data storage systems. In contrast, only 11 describe requirements from compute and network infrastructure. is should not be surprising given that GDPR is more focused on the control-plane aspects of personal data (like collecting, securing, storing, moving, sharing, deleting etc.,) than the actual processing of it.
GDPR in the Wild
e rst year of GDPR has demonstrated both the need for and challenges of a comprehensive privacy law. On one hand, people have been exercising their newfound rights like the ability to Figure 1 : GDPR de nes four roles and distinguishes between three types of data. Only the datastore that contains personal and GDPR metadata comes under the GDPR purview. e arrows out of a datastore indicate read-only access, while the arrows into it modify it. (1) e controller can collect, store, delete and update any personal-and GDPR-metadata, (2) A customer can read, update, or delete any personal data and GDPR-metadata that concerns them, (3) A processor reads personal data and produces derived data, and (4) Regulators access GDPR metadata to investigate customer complaints. download all the personal data that companies have amassed on them [18] , and not been shy to report any shortcomings. In fact, the EU data protection board reports [16] 94622 complaints from individuals and organizations in the rst 9 months of GDPR.
However, any a empt to regulate decade-long practices of commoditizing personal data is not without consequences. A number of companies like Instapaper, Klout, and Unroll.me voluntarily terminated their services in Europe to avoid the hassles of compliance. Like wise, most of the programmatic ad exchanges [20] of Europe were forced to shut down. is was triggered by Google and Facebook restricting access to their platforms to those ad exchanges that could not verify the legality of the personal data they possessed. But, several organizations could comply by making minor modi cations to their business models. For example, media site USA Today turned o all advertisements [42] , whereas the New York Times stopped serving personalized ads [21] .
As G 28 precludes employing any data processor that does not comply with GDPR, the cloud providers have been swi in showcasing [49, 48, 35] their compliance. However, given the monetary and technical challenges in redesigning the existing systems, the focus has unfortunately shi ed to reactive security. It is still an open question if services like Amazon Macie [5] , which employs machine learning to automatically discover, monitor, and alert misuse of personal data on behalf of legacy cloud applications would survive the GDPR scrutiny.
Regulators have been active and vigilant as well: the number of ongoing and completed investigations in the rst 9 months of GDPR is reported to be 206326. Regulators have already levied penalties on several companies including €50M on Google [37] for lacking a legal basis for their ads personalization, and £184M on British Airways [33] for lacking security of processing. However, the clearest sign of GDPR's e ectiveness is in the fact that regulators have received 64684 voluntary data breach noti cations from companies in the rst nine months of GDPR. In contrast, that number was 945 for the six months prior to GDPR [43] .
DESIGNING FOR COMPLIANCE
We analyze the articles of GDPR, both individually and collectively, from a database system perspective. e goal of this section is to distill our analysis into a ributes and actions that correspond to database systems. We identify three overarching themes: how personal data is to be represented, how personal data is to be protected, and what interfaces need to be designed for personal data. ese three collectively determine how GDPR impacts database systems.
Characterizing Personal Data
GDPR de nes personal data to be any information concerning a natural person. As such, it includes both personally identi able information like credit card numbers as well as information that may not be unique to a person, say search terms sent to Google.
is signi cantly increases the proportion of data that comes under GDPR purview. Also, by not restricting the applicability of GDPR to any particular domain like health and education as in the case of HIPAA [2] and FERPA [1] respectively, GDPR brings in virtually all industries under its foray.
Next, to govern the lifecycle of personal data, GDPR introduces several behavioral characteristics associated with it; we call these GDPR metadata.
is constitutes a big departure from the evolution of data processing systems, which have typically viewed data as a helper resource that could be fungibly used by so ware programs to achieve their goals. We discover that, when taken collectively, these metadata a ributes convert personal data from an inert entity to a dynamic entity that possesses its own purpose, objections, time-to-live etc., such that it can no longer be used as a fungible commodity. Below, we list the seven metadata a ributes that must be stored along with every piece of personal data.
1.
Purpose. G 5(1b) states that personal data should only be collected for speci c and explicit purposes, and not further processed in a manner incompatible with those purposes. Also, the recent Google case [37] has established that GDPR explicitly prohibits any purpose bundling.
2. Time to live. Given the value of personal data, the longstanding practice in computing has been to preserve them inde nitely (or at least till they are economically viable). However, G 5(1e) mandates that personal data shall be kept for no longer than necessary for the purposes for which it was collected. In addition, G 13(2a) requires the controller to provide this TTL value to the customer at the time of data collection.
3.
Objections. G 21 grants users a right to object, at any time, to any personal data being used for any purposes. is right is broadly construed, and a controller has to demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds to override it. is property, essentially sets up a blacklist for every personal data item. 4. Audit trail. G 30 requires controllers and processors to maintain records of their processing activities. en, G 33(3a) requires that in the event of a data breach, the controller shall report the approximate number of customers and their personal data records a ected. In light of these requirements, cloud providers including Amazon [6] have started supporting ne-grained per-item access monitoring. is would create an audit trail for every personal data item.
5.
Origin and sharing. Every personal data item should have an origin i.e., how it was originally procured, and sharing information i.e., external entities with which it has been shared (G 13, 14) . e data trail set up by these articles should enable customers to track their personal data in secondary markets.
6. Automated decision-making. is concerns the emerging use of algorithmic decision-making. G 15(1) grants customers a right to seek information on which of their personal data was used in automated decision-making. Conversely, G 22 allows them to request that their personal data be not used for automated decision-making.
7. Associated person. G 15 enables users to ask for all the personal data that concern them along with all the associated GDPR metadata. As such, it is imperative to store the identication of the person to whom it concerns.
Impact on Database System Design. We call our observation that every personal data item should be associated with a set of GDPR metadata properties as metadata explosion. is has significant consequences in both control-and data-path operations of database systems. First, having to store metadata along with the data increases the overall storage space. Second, having to validate each access (for purpose etc.,) and having to update a er each access (for audit etc.,), increases the access latency for personal data. ough it may be possible to optimize-for example, by reusing some metadata across records, and by caching reads-the overheads cannot be reduced to trivial.
Protecting Personal Data
GDPR declares (in G 24) that those who collect and process personal data are solely responsible for its privacy and protection. us, it not only mandates the controllers and processors to proactively implement security measures, but also imposes the burden of proving compliance (in G 5(2)) on them. Based on our analysis of GDPR, we identify ve security-centric features that must be supported in the database system.
1. Timely Deletion. In addition to G 5(1e) that requires every personal data item to have an expiry date, G 17 grants customers the right to request erasure of their personal data at any time. us, datastores must have mechanisms to allow timely deletion of possibly large amounts of data.
2. Monitoring and Logging. As per G 30 and G 33(3a), the database system needs to monitor its operations in both data path (i.e., read or write) and control path (say, changes to access control), so that compliance can be established upon request by a regulator, or relevant information be shared with regulators and customers in the event of data breaches.
3. Indexing via Metadata. Ability to access groups of data based on one or more metadata elds is essential. For example, controllers needing to modify access control (G 25 (2)) against a given customer's data; G 28(3c) allowing processors to access only those personal data for which they have requisite access and valid purpose; G 15-18, 20-22 granting customers the right to act on their personal data in a collective manner (deleting, porting, downloading etc.,); nally, G 31 allowing regulators to seek access to metadata belonging to affected customers.
4.
Encryption. G 32 requires controllers to implement encryption on personal data, both at rest and in transit. While pseudonymization may help reduce the scope and size of data needing encryption, it is still required of the datastore.
5. Access Control. G 25(2) calls on the controller to ensure that by default, personal data are not made accessible to an indefinite number of entities. So, to limit access to personal data based on established purposes, for permi ed entities, and for a prede ned duration of time, the datastore needs an access control that is ne-grained and dynamic.
Impact on Database System Design. GDPR's goal of data protection by design and by default sits at odd with the traditional system design goals of optimizing for cost, performance, and reliability. While our analysis identi ed a set of just ve security features, we note that modern database systems have not evolved to support these features e ciently. us, a fully-compliant database system would likely experience signi cant performance degradation.
Interfacing with Personal Data
GDPR de nes four distinct entities-controller, customer, processor, and regulator-that interface with the database systems (shown in Figure 1 ). en, its articles collectively describe the control-and data-path operations that each of these entities are allowed to perform on the database system. We refer to this set of operations as GDPR queries, and group them into seven categories:
• CREATE-RECORD to allow controllers to insert a record containing personal data with its associated metadata (G 24).
• DELETE-RECORD-BY-{KEY|PUR|TTL|USR} to allow customers to request erasure of a particular record (G 17); to allow controllers to delete records corresponding to a completed purpose (G 5.1b), to purge expired records (G 5.1e), and to clean up all records of a particular customer.
• READ-DATA-BY-{KEY|PUR|USR|OBJ|DEC} to allow processors to access individual data items or those matching a given purpose (G 28); to let customers extract all their data (G 20); to allow processors to get data that do not object to speci c usage (G 21.3) or to automated decision-making (G 22).
• READ-METADATA-BY-{KEY|USR|SHR} to allow customers to nd out metadata associated with their data (G 15); to assist regulators to perform user-speci c investigations, and investigations into third-party sharing (G 13.1).
• UPDATE-DATA-BY-KEY to allow customers to rectify inaccuracies in personal data (G 16).
• UPDATE-METADATA-BY-{KEY|PUR|USR} to allow customers to change their objections (G 18.1) or alter previous consents (G 7.3); to allow processors to register the use of given personal data for automated decision making (G 22.3); to enable controllers to update access lists and third-party sharing information for groups of data (G 13.3).
• GET-SYSTEM-{LOGS|FEATURES} to enable regulators to investigate system logs based on time ranges (G 33, 34), and to identify supported security capabilities (G 24,25) .
Impact on Database System Design. When taken in totality, GDPR queries may resemble traditional workload, but it would be remiss to ignore two signi cant di erences: (i) there is a heavy skew of metadata-based operations, and (ii) there is a need to enforce restrictions on who could perform which operations under what conditions. ese observations make it impractical to store GDPR metadata away from the personal data (say, on backup storage to save money), which in turn may a ect system optimizations like caching and prefetching (since the results, and even the ability to execute a query are conditional on several metadata factors).
Summary
Table-1 summarizes our analysis of GDPR. We identify three signi cant changes needed to achieve GDPR compliance: ability to handle metadata explosion, ability to protect data by design and by default, and ability to support GDPR queries. While it is clear that these changes will a ect the design and operation of all contemporary database systems, we lack systematic approaches to gauge the magnitude of changes required and its associated performance impact. Towards solving these challenges, we design GDPRbench, a functional benchmark for GDPR-compliant database systems (in Section-4), and present a case study of retro ing two popular databases into GDPR compliance (in Section-6).
GDPRBENCH
GDPRbench is an open-source benchmark to assess the GDPR compliance of database systems. It aims to provide quanti able ground truth concerning correctness and performance under GDPR. In the rest of this section, we motivate the need for GDPRbench, and then present its design and implementation.
Why (a New) Benchmark?
As our analysis in Section-3 reveals, GDPR signi cantly a ects the design and operation of datastores that hold personal data. However, existing benchmarks like TPC and YCSB do not recognize the abstraction of personal data: its characteristics, storage restrictions, or interfacing requirements.
is is particularly troublesome given the diversity of stakeholders and their con icting interests. For example, companies may prefer a minimal compliance that avoids legal troubles without incurring much performance overhead or modi cations to their systems. On the other hand, customers may want to see a strict compliance that prioritizes their privacy rights over technological and business concerns of controllers. Finally, regulators need to arbitrate this customercontroller tussle in a fast-evolving technology world. us, having objective means of quantifying GDPR compliance is essential.
A rigorous framework would allow system designers to compare and contrast the GDPR implications of their design choices, as well as enable service providers to be er calibrate their o erings. For example, many cloud providers currently report the GDPR compliance of their services in a coarse yes-no format [6] , making it di cult for regulators and customers to assess either the compliance levels or performance impact. Finally, many governments around the world are actively dra ing privacy regulations. For instance, India's ongoing Personal Data Protection bill [14] , and California'a proposed Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [3] . is benchmark provides a methodical way to study the e cacy of GDPR regulations, and then adopt suitable parts of this law.
Benchmark Design
Our approach to benchmark design is guided by two factors: insights from our GDPR analysis, and real-world data from the rst year of GDPR roll out. At a high level, GDPRbench models the working of a database deployed by an organization that collects and processes personal data. Below, we describe the key elements of the benchmark design.
Data Records
Given the stringent requirements of GDPR, it is prudent to assume that personal data would be stored separately from other types of data.
us, our benchmark exclusively focuses on personal data records. Each record takes the form <Key><Data> <Metadata>, where <Key> is a variable length unique identi er, <Data> is a variable length personal data, and <Meta-data> is a sequence of seven a ributes, each of which has a three le er a ribute name followed by a variable length list of a ribute values. We enforce all the elds of the record to have ASCII characters (except for semicolon and comma, which we use as separators). We illustrate this with an example record: ph-1x4b;123-456-7890;PUR=ads,2fa;TTL=365days; USR=neo;OBJ=∅;DEC=∅;SHR=∅;SRC=first-party;
Here, ph-1x4b is the unique key and 123-456-7890 is the personal data. Following these two, we have seven a ributes namely purpose (PUR), time-to-live (TTL), user (USR), objections (OBJ), automated decisions (DEC), third-party sharing (SHR), and originating source (SRC). Some a ributes have a single value, some have a list of values, and a few others have ∅.
Workloads
We de ne four workloads that correspond to the four core entities of GDPR: controller, customer, processor and regulator. We compose the workloads using the queries outlined in Section-3.3, and concerning only the ow of personal data and its associated metadata (denoted in Figure-1 by thick and do ed lines respectively). en, we glean over usage pa erns and traces from the real-world to accurately calibrate the proportion of these queries and the distribution of the data records they act on. However, since GDPR is just a year old, the availability of said data in the public domain is somewhat limited.
us, for those situation where no real data is available, we make reasonable assumptions in composing the workloads. e resulting GDPRbench workloads are summerized in Table-2, and described in detail below. While GDPRbench runs these workloads in its default con guration, we make it possible to update or replace them with custom workloads, when necessary.
Controller. e controller workload consists of three categories of operations: (i) creation of records, (ii) timely deletion of records, and (iii) updates to GDPR metadata towards managing access control, categorization, third-party sharing, and location management. While the controller is also responsible for the security and reliability of the underlying storage system, we expect these to be infrequent, non real-time operations and thus, do not include them in our queries.
To determine the frequency and distribution of operations, we rely on three GDPR properties: rst, in a steady state, the number of records created must match the number of records deleted (since G 5.1 mandates that all personal data must have an expiry date); next, a valid sequence of operation for each record should always be create, updates, and delete in that order; lastly, the controller queries should follow a uniform distribution (since G 5.1c prevents the controller from collecting any data that are not necessary or useful). We set the update queries to occur twice as frequently as creates and deletes. Customer. is workload represents the key rights that customers exercise while interfacing with the database system: (i) the right to delete any of their data, (ii) the right to extract and port all their data, (iii) the right to rectify their personal data, and nally (iv) the right to access and update the metadata associated with a given personal data.
To determine the frequency and distribution of customer queries, we study operational traces from Google's implementation of Rightto-be-Forgo en (RTBF) [15] in Europe. ough GDPR has a namesake article (G 17), RTBF is a distinct 2014 EU ruling that allowed individuals to request the search engines to delist URLs that contain inaccurate, irrelevant and excessively personal information from their search results. We gather three high-level takeaways from the Google report: rst, they received 2.4 million requests over a span of three years at a relatively stable average of 45k monthly requests. Second, 84.5% of all delisting requests came from individual users. Finally, the requests showed a heavy skew Figure 2 : GDPRbench core workloads (a), and its architecture (b). e table describes the high-level purpose of each workload along with its composite queries and their default parameters. We select these defaults based on GDPR properties, data from EU regulators, and usage pa erns from industry. e architecture diagram shows the components of YCSB that we reused in gray and our GDPR-speci c extensions in blue.
Core Workloads
towards a small number of users (top 0.25% users generated 20.8% delisting). Based on these insights, we compose our customer workload by assigning equal weights to all query types and con guring their record selections to follow a Zipf distribution.
Regulator. e role of the regulator is to investigate and enforce the GDPR laws. In case of data breaches or systematic compliance violations, the regulator would summon access to detailed system logs for the period of interest. In case of privacy rights violation of individual customers, they would seek access to the GDPR metadata associated with that particular customer. However, regulators do not need access to any personal data.
To calibrate the regulator workload, we inspect the European Data Protection Board's summary [16] of the rst 9 months of GDPR roll out. It reports that the supervisory authorities received 206326 complaints EU-wide. Out of these, 94622 (46%) were direct customer complaints concerning their privacy rights, 64684 (31%) were voluntary data breach noti cations from controllers, and the rest (23%) were statutory inquiries against multinational companies, and complaints by non-government and civil rights organizations. We set the weights of regulator queries to match the percentages from this report. Next, in line with the Google RTBF experience, we expect the rights violations and compliance complaints to follow a Zipf distribution.
Processor. e processor, working on behalf of a controller, performs a well-de ned set of operations on personal data belonging to that controller. While this role is commonly external, say a cloud provider, the law also allows controllers to be processors for themselves. In either case, the processor workload is restricted to read operations on personal data.
We compose the processor workload to re ect both existing and emerging access pa erns. For the former, we refer to the ve representative cloud application workloads identi ed by YCSB, as shown in Table- 3. While some operations (like updates and inserts) are not permi ed for processors, their access pa erns and record distributions are still relevant. For the emerging category, we rely on our GDPR analysis, which identi es access pa erns conditioned on metadata a ributes like purpose and objection. Since this is still an emerging category, we limit its weight to 20%.
Benchmark Metrics
We identify three metrics that provide a foundational characterization of a database's GDPR compliance: correctness against GDPR workloads, time taken to respond to GDPR queries, and the storage space overhead. Correctness. We de ne correctness as the percentage of query responses that match the results expected by the benchmark. is number is computed cumulatively across all the four workloads. It is important to note that correctness as de ned by GDPRbench is a necessary but not su cient condition for the database to be GDPR compliant. is is because GDPR compliance includes multitude of issues including data security, breach noti cation, prior consultation and others that cover the whole lifecycle of personal data. However, the goal of this metric is to provide a basic validation for a database's ability to store and process metadata-based access control. Completion time. is metric measures the time taken to complete all the GDPR queries, and we report it separately for each workload. For majority of GDPR workloads, completion time is more relevant than the traditional metrics like latency. is is because GDPR operations embody the rights and responsibilities of the involved actors, and thus, their utility is reliant upon completing the operation (and not merely starting them). is is also re ective of the real world, where completion time gets reported more prominently than any other metric. For e.g., Google cloud guarantees that any request to delete a customer's personal data would be completed within 180 days. Space overhead. It is impossible for a database to comply with the regulations of GDPR without storing large volumes of meta-data associated with personal data (a phenomenon described in Section-3.1 as metadata explosion). Since the quantity of metadata overshadows that of personal data, it is an important metric to track. GDPRbench reports this metric as the ratio of total size of the database to the total size of personal data in it. us, by de nition, it will always be a rational number >1. As a metric, storage space overhead is complementary to completion time since optimizing for one will likely worsen the other. For example, database applications can reduce the storage space overhead by normalizing the metadata. However, this will increase the completion time of GDPR queries by requiring access to multiple tables.
Implementation
We implement GDPRbench by adapting and extending YCSB. is choice was driven by two factors. First, YCSB is an opensource benchmark with a modular design, making it easy to reuse its components and build new ones on top of it. Second, it is a modern benchmark (released in 2010) and has a widespread community adoption with support for 30+ storage and database systems. In the following, we describe the architecture and operations of GDPRbench. Figure-2b shows the core infrastructure components of YCSB (in gray), and our modi cations and extensions (in blue). Alongside the core workloads of YCSB, we create new GDPR workloads that describe operations and their proportions for GDPR roles (as in Table- 2). Inside the YCSB core infrastructure, we modify the workload engine to parse GDPR queries and translate them to corresponding storage operations. Note that we reuse the YCSB runtime engine that manages threads and statistics. Finally, the storage interface layer consists of client stubs (one per database system) that translates the generic operations into speci c APIs supported by a given storage/database system. Since GDPR introduces many new operations that are not natively supported by most database systems (for example, se ing TTL for a record, or operations based on metadata), we had to implement new client stubs for all database systems.
us far, we have added support for Redis and PostgreSQL, but our goal is to extend this to most major database systems. We have added or modi ed ∼1300 LoC in the workload engine, and ∼ 400 LoC for Redis and PostgreSQL clients.
GDPR-COMPLIANT DBMS
Our goal is to present a case study of retro ing current generation systems to operate in a GDPR world. Accordingly, we select two widely used open-source systems: Redis [10] , an in-memory NoSQL store, and PostgreSQL [9] , a fully featured RDBMS. Our effort to transform Redis and PostgreSQL into GDPR compliance is largely guided by the recommendations in their o cial blogs [12, 9] , and other experiences from real-world deployments. While we intend to introduce GDPR compliance into more database systems, and integrate them with GDPRbench, we picked Redis and PostgreSQL as our initial choices as they represent distinct design philosophies, and thus provides a level of generality for our ndings. In the following, we describe our code and con guration changes to these two systems, and present microbenchmark measurements.
Redis
From amongst the features outlined in Section-3, Redis fully supports monitoring; partially supports timely deletion and metadata indexing; but o ers no native support for encryption and access control. In lieu of natively extending Redis' limited security model, we incorporate third-party modules for encryption. For data at rest, we use the Linux Uni ed Key Setup (LUKS) [7] , and for data in transit, we set up transport layer security (TLS) using Stunnel [11] . We defer access control to DBMS applications, and in our case, we extend the Redis client in GDPRbench to enforce metadata-based access rights. Next, while Redis o ers several mechanisms to generate audit logs, we determine that piggybacking on append-only-le (AOF) results in the least overhead. However, since AOF only records the operations that modify Redis' state, we update its internal logic to log all interactions including reads and scans.
Finally, though Redis o ers TTL natively, it su ers from indeterminism as it is implemented via a lazy probabilistic algorithm: once every 100ms, it samples 20 random keys from the set of keys with expire ag set; if any of these twenty have expired, they are actively deleted; if less than 5 keys got deleted, then wait till the next iteration, else repeat the loop immediately. us, as percentage of keys with associated expire increases, the probability of their timely deletion decreases. To quantify this delay in erasure, we populate Redis with keys having expiry times. e time-to-live values are set up such that 20% of the keys will expire in shortterm (5 minutes) and 80% in the long-term (5 days). Figure-3a then shows the time Redis took to completely erase the short-term keys a er 5 minutes have elapsed. As expected, the time to erasure increases with the database size. For example, when there are 128k keys, clean up of expired keys (∼25k of them) took nearly 3 hours. To support a stricter compliance, we modify Redis to iterate through the entire list of keys with associated EXPIRE. en, we re-run the same experiment to verify that all the expired keys are erased within sub-second latency for sizes of up to 1 million keys.
PostgreSQL
As a feature-rich RDBMS, PostgreSQL o ers native support to four of the ve GDPR features, with the exception of Timely deletion. For encryption, we set up LUKS and SSL (in verify-CA mode). For logging, in addition to the built-in csvlog, we set up a row-level security policy to record query responses. Next, we create metadata indexing via the built-in secondary indices. As with Redis, we enforce metadata-based access control in the external client of GDPRbench. Finally, since PostgreSQL does not o er native support for time-based expiry of rows, we modify the INSERT queries to include the expiry timestamp and then implement a daemon that checks for expired rows periodically (currently set to 1 sec).
To e ciently support GDPR queries, an administrator would likely con gure secondary indices for GDPR metadata. Interest- ingly, while PostgreSQL natively supports secondary indices, we observe that its performance begins to drop sign cantly when the number of such indices increases as shown in Figure-3b . Using the built-in pgbench tool, we measure throughput on the Y-axis, and the number of secondary indices created on the X-axis. We run this pgbench experiment with a DB size of 15GB, a scale factor of 1000, and with 32 clients. Just introducing two secondary indices, for the widely used metadata criteria of purpose and userid, reduces PostgreSQL's throughput to 33% of the original.
Key Takeaways. Introducing GDPR compliance in Redis and Post-greSQL was not an arduous task: Redis needed 120 lines of code changes, and Postgres about 30 lines of scripting. We accomplished all of our modi cations, con guration changes, and microbenchmarking in about a person-month. However, as our microbenchmarks on TTL and secondary indices show, even for supported GDPR features, administrators should carefully analyze the impact on their DBMS deployments.
EVALUATION
We evaluate the impact of GDPR on database systems by answering the following questions:
• What is the overhead of GDPR features on traditional workloads? (in Section-6.1) • How do compliant database systems perform against GDPR workloads? (in Section-6.2) • How does the scale of personal data impact performance? (in Section-6.3)
Approach. To answer these questions, we use the GDPR compliant versions of Redis and PostgreSQL described in section-5. Next, to quantify the performance overhead of GDPR features on traditional workloads, we use the industry standard Yahoo Cloud Serving Benchmark [19] . Finally, using GDPRbench, we determine the state-of-the-art performance levels of our GDPR-compliant Redis and PostgreSQL against realistic GDPR workloads. Experimental setup. We perform all our experiments on Chameleon cloud [28] . 
Overheads of Compliance
e goal of this experiment is to quantify the performance overhead of introducing GDPR compliance. To do so, we use the industry standard YCSB [19] . As shown in Redis. Figure 4a shows the YCSB workloads on the X-axis and Redis' throughput on the Y-axis for each of the newly introduced GDPR security features. We normalize all the values to a baseline version of Redis that has no security. First, we see that encryption reduces the throughput by ∼10%, and our modi cation towards achieving timely deletion brings it down by ∼20%. Next, we setup Redis to log all its operations via the AoF mechanism (not synchronously in real-time, but in batches synchronized once every second), and see the throughput drops by ∼70%. Finally, when all these features are enabled in tandem, Redis experiences a slowdown of 80%.
PostgreSQL. Similar to Redis, we measure the throughput of Post-greSQL when con gured with di erent security features in Figure 4b . First o , we see that the e ect of GDPR on PostgreSQL is not as pronounced as in the case of Redis. is is largely attributable to Redis's minimalist security model as well as the singlethreaded design. PostgreSQL experiences 10-20% degradation due to encryption and TTL checks, while logging incurs a 30-40% overhead. When all features are enabled in conjunction, PostgreSQL slows down to 50-60% of its baseline performance. Summary. While the performance drop is not surprising in itself since the introduced security measures a ect all of the read/write operations, it is the magnitude of the overhead (5× for Redis and ∼2× for PostgreSQL) that makes GDPR compliance debilitating for production environments.
GDPR Workloads
While the previous section demonstrated the performance overhead due to GDPR security features, the goal of this section is to quantify how the compliant versions of Redis and PostgreSQL per- Table 3 : Storage space overhead corresponding to Figure-5 . In default con guration, GDPRbench has 25 bytes of metadata a ributes for a 10 byte personal data record. Our evaluation indicates that introducing secondary indices for all the metadata elds increases the storage space overhead from 3.5× to 5.95×.
form against real-world GDPR workloads. To do so, we con gure GDPRbench to load 100K personal records, and perform 1K operations for Redis and 10K operations for PostgreSQL on each of its four workloads. We use the default proportion of workload queries and record distributions as speci ed in Table- 2, and run it with 8 threads. Note how the number of operations is two orders of magnitude lower than in the YCSB con guration. is shows the challenges of supporting GDPR queries on systems not exclusively built for them.
Redis. Figure-5a shows Redis' completion time along Y-axis, and its storage space overhead along Y2-axis. As expected, the processor workload runs the fastest given its heavy skew towards nonmetadata based operations. In comparison, all other workloads are 2-3× slower, with the controller workload taking the longest. e gure also benchmarks the metadata explosion. In the default conguation, we see a space overhead ratio of 3.5 i.e., for every byte of personal data inserted, the storage system size increases by 3.5 bytes. Unfortunately, since Redis lacks the support for multiple secondary indices, we do not show any further optimizations. PostgreSQL. Next, Figure-5b shows the corresponding baseline compliance graph for PostgreSQL. Right away, we see that the completion times are ∼35% faster than Redis for controller and regulator, and ∼50% faster for the other two workloads, despite running a workload with 10× more operations. Our pro ling indicates that PostgreSQL, being an RDBMS, is be er at supporting complex queries e ciently, on top of implementing GDPR security features with much less overhead (as discussed in section-6.1. However, the storage space overhead remains unchanged compared to Redis. Finally, given the outsized impact of metadata based quries in GDPRbench, we con gure PostgreSQL with secondary indices for all metadata. Figure-5c then shows how this improves PostgreSQL's baseline compliance performance. Expectedly, the completion time improves for all the workloads, though the scale of improvement is more pronounced for controller workload. is is primarily because the gain in speed by having secondary indices is annulled to an extent by the overhead of maintaining several secondary indices. However, adding these extra indices increase the storage space overhead from 3.5× to 5.95×. GDPR vs. traditional workloads. In Figure-6 , we compare how Redis and PostgreSQL perform under identical conditions of hardware, so ware, and con guration against two workloads: YCSB and GDPRbench. For traditional workloads represented by YCSB, both Redis and PostgreSQL achieve throughputs in the range of 10000 operations per second. In contrast, GDPR workloads signciantly degrade their performance: by 2-3 orders of magnitude for PostgreSQL, and by 4 orders of magnitude for Redis. Summary. GDPRbench re ects the challenges of supporting GDPR speci c workloads on retro ed compliant systems. While both Redis and PostgreSQL su er from orders of magnitude degradation in their performance compared to traditional workloads, our evaluation shows that feature-rich RDBMS like PostgreSQL performs be er than NoSQL stores like Redis.
Effect of Scale
Finally, we explore how an increase in the scale of data a ects the systems. In particular, we structure this experiment to re ect a scenario where a company acquires new customers, thus increas- ing the volume of data in the DB. However, the data of the existing customers remain unchanged.
is experiment then measures how Redis and PostgreSQL perform for queries concerning the orignal set of customers. We lay out experiments in two di erent contexts: rst, when the database contains non-personal data, we run YCSB workloads; second, when the database contains personal data, we use GDPRbench customer workload. In both cases, we scale the volume of data within the database but perform the same number of operations at every scale. For both GDPR and traditional workloads, we use identical underlying hardware, same version of GDPR-compliant Redis and PostgreSQL so ware, and retain the same con guration as in section-6.1. Redis. For Redis, we populate 100K records and perform 1K operations. First, Figure-7a shows Redis' completion time for YCSB workload C. We see that Redis takes almost identical time to complete 1K (read) operations, despite increasing the database volume by 3 orders of magnitude. is is not unexpected as Redis supports e cient, constant-time CRUD operations.
However, when we switch from traditional workloads to GDPR workload, Figure-7b paints a di erent picture. In this graph, we linearly increase the volume of personal data from 100K to 500K records, and we see a corresponding linear increase in the completion time.
is indicates that the completion time is not only a function of the number of operations but also the size of the database. In hindsight, this is not completely unexpected as metadata based queries require O(n) access, especially in absense of secondary indices. PostgreSQL. Finally, we conduct the same scale experiment on PostgreSQL (metadata-index version) using 100K records and 10K operations. While PostgreSQL's performance for YCSB (shown in Figure-8a) is expectedly similar to that of Redis, its response to GDPR workload (shown in Figure-8b) is much be er than that of Redis. While PostgreSQL is still a ected by the increase in DB size, the impact on its performance is muted. Our pro ling indicates that this is largely due to secondary indices speeding up metadata based queries. But as the DB size increases, the overhead of maintaining multiple secondary indices does introduce some performance degradation. Summary. Current generation database systems do not scale well for GDPR workloads. While PostgreSQL with metadata indexing fares be er than Redis, neither of them exhibit a scale response that make them production ready, especially in environments with large amounts of personal data. (Figure-7a ), PostgreSQL's GDPR performance worsens only moderately thanks to its use of metadata indices.
DISCUSSION
Our experiments and analyses identify several implications for administering GDPR-compliant database systems in the real world, as well as research challenges emerging from it. We discuss them below.
Real-world Implications
Compliance may results in high performance overheads. Our work demonstrates that while it is straight-forward to retro t Redis and PostgreSQL into GDPR compliance, the resulting performance degradation of 2-5× (in section-6.1) raises fundamental questions of compliance-e ciency tradeo s. Database engineers and adminstrators should carefully analyze the performance implications of any compliance e orts, especially in production environments. For instance, recommendations from cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services [49] , Microso Azure [35] , and Google Cloud [48] primarily focus on checklist of security features without much a ention to their performance implications. Compliant systems experience challenges at scale. A key takeaway from our scale experiments (in section-6.3) is that naive e orts at achieving GDPR compliance results in poor scalability. Increasing the volume of personal data, even by modest amounts, makes it challenging to respond to customer's GDPR rights in a timely manner, or even to comply with GDPR responsibilities in real-time. us, consideration for scale ought to be an important factor in any compliance e ort.
Additionally, GDPR quells the notion that personal data, once collected, is largely immutable. In light of GDPR's right to be forgo en and right to recti cation, customers are allowed to exercise much greater control over their personal data. Consequently, traditional solutions to scale problems like replication and sharding would likely incur extra overheads than before. It might be worth investigating the bene ts of a GDPR co-processor. Compliance is easier in RDBMS than NoSQL. We observe that achieving compliance is simpler and e ective with RDBMSs than NoSQL stores. In our case, Redis needed two changes at the internal design level as opposed to PostgreSQL, which only needed con guration changes and external scripting. Even from a performance point of view, the drop is steeper in high-performant Redis as compared to PostgreSQL. We hope our ndings encourage designers and maintainers of all categories of database systems to reevaluate their design choices, optimization goals, and deployment scenarios in the light of privacy regulations like GDPR.
GDPR is strict in principle yet exible in practice. ough GDPR is clear in its high-level goals, it is intentionally vague in its technical speci cations. Consider G 17 that requires controllers to erase personal data upon request by the customer. It does not specify how soon a er the request should the data be removed. Let us consider its implications in the real world: Google cloud, which claims GDPR-compliance, describes the deletion of customer data as an iterative process [4] that could take up to 180 to fully complete.
Such exibility is not unique to the time of completion. Consider G 30 that requires processors to keep an audit trail of interactions with personal data. e regulation does not specify if the log data should be stored in a persistent media, or how o en should it be updated, or how easily should it be accessible. Similarly, G 32 requires controllers to implement pseudonymization and encryption without specifying any particular algorithms or techniques for either. us, having compliance as a spectrum instead of xed targets, allows database engineers and administrators to explore the tradeo between strict compliance vs. high performance.
Research Challenges
Our evaluations show that trivially extending the existing mechanisms and policies to achieve compliance would result in significant performance overheads. We observe two common sources of this: (i) retro ing new features when they do not align with the core design principles. For example, adding to Redis' minimalist security model, and (ii) using features in ways that are not intended by their designers. For example, enabling continuous logging or multiple secondary indices in production environments. We identify three key challenges that must be addressed to achieve compliance e ciently: e cient auditing, e cient time-based deletion, and e cient metadata indexing.
Another key tussle in the design space is whether to build compliance at the level of individual infrastructure components (i.e., compute servers, and database systems) versus implementing endto-end compliance of given regulations (i.e., implementing rightof-access in a music streaming service). Both these directions will result in di erent performance tradeo s and give rise to di erent system interfaces. e former approach makes the e ort more contained and thus, suits the cloud model be er (where GDPR explicitly prohibits selling products and services that do not comply with its regulations). e la er approach provides opportunities for cross-layer optimizations (e.g., avoiding access control in multiple layers).
RELATED WORK
A preliminary version of this analysis appeared [39] in a workshop. To the best of our knowledge, this work is one of the rst to analyze the impact of GDPR on database systems. While there have been a number of recent work analyzing GDPR from privacy and legal perspectives [34, 25, 47, 13, 44, 17, 45, 22, 27] , the database and systems communities are just beginning to get involved. DatumDB [30] proposes an architectural vision for a database that natively supports guaranteed deletion and consent management. Compliance by construction [38] envisions new database abstractions to support privacy rights. In contrast, we focus on the challenges that existing DBMS face in complying with GDPR, and design a benchmark to quantify its impact.
Orthogonal to our focus, researchers are working on implementing and analyzing individual GDPR articles end-to-end. For example, Google researchers [15] have chronicled their experiences implementing the Right to be Forgo en for their search service. Two groups of researchers from Oxford University analyzed [24, 46] how GDPR's right to explanation impacts the design of machine learning and arti cial intelligence systems. Finally, there is a wealth of blog posts that describe how to achieve GDPR compliance for popular storage systems including MongoDB [29] , Cock-roachDB [32] , and Redis [12] .
CONCLUSION
is work analyzes GDPR from a database systems perspective. We discover the phenomenon of metadata explosion, identify new workloads of GDPR, and design a new benchmark for quantifying GDPR compliance. We nd that despite needing to implement a modest number of changes to storage systems, GDPR compliance results in signi cant performance overheads. Our analyses and experiments identify several implications for administering GDPR-compliant database systems in the real world. We hope that GDPRbench would be useful for customers, controllers, and regulators in interpreting the compliance level of storage systems, and helpful for database designers in understanding the complianceperformance tradeo .
